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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES: 
THE FORCE OF BLACKMAIL'S CENTRAL CASE* 
WENDY J. GORDONt 
INTRODUCTION 
Blackmail commentary continues to proliferate. One purpose 
of this paper is to show what we agree on. Its primary tool will be 
to define what I call the "central case" of blackmail literature, and 
to supply the connecting links that will allow us to see how various 
normative theories converge in condemning central case blackmail. 
Admittedly, the law criminalizes more than my central case. But 
once we recognize that the central case is neither puzzling nor 
paradoxical, it may be easier to handle the border cases that arise. 
The Article first demonstrates why criminalizing blackmail 
involves neither a paradox nor a contradiction, notwithstanding the 
fact that blackmail law prohibits offers to sell discreditable informa-
tion that the law would permit the seller to disclose without 
penalty.1 The Article then sets out the central case of blackmail, 2 
the standard economic argument for its criminalization,3 and the 
nonstandard uncertainties that wealth effects produce in this area.4 
The Article then turns to its primary topic: presenting a 
deontologic moral justification for criminalizing blackmail.5 The 
nonconsequentialist moral view best captures, I believe, the primary 
reasons why courts and legislatures have in fact made blackmail 
unlawful. I argue that most of the supposed ambiguities surround-
ing the deontologic case are red herrings obscuring the simple 
nature of the wrong committed by the blackmailer. 6 I also defend 
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this argument against challenges such as the libertarian view that 
blackmail is indistinguishable from an ordinary commercial 
transaction. 7 
The final sections of the Article return to discussing blackmail 
law from a consequentialist perspective, but with a twist: I present 
consequentialist arguments for criminalizing blackmail based upon 
the impact that noneconomic motives can have on the outcomes of 
blackmail attempts, and the impact that law can have upon these 
noneconomic motives. 8 I suggest in conclusion that truth cannot 
be found in either the economic ( consequentialist) or deontologic 
(nonconsequentialist) approaches standing alone, but that some 
union of the two is necessary for satisfactory resolutions of complex 
cases.9 
I. THE NONEXISTENT PARADOX 
At the core of blackmail law supposedly lies the following 
paradox: Everyone has the right to seek money if he so chooses, 
and a possessor of information is ordinarily at liberty to disclose the 
information or keep it secret as he chooses, "but if I combine these 
rights it is blackmail. "10 That is, it is criminal for the possessor of 
information to demand money in exchange for not doing some-
thing-disclosing information-that it is lawful for him to do or not 
do.II 
Though this may be a surprising conjunction, it is, strictly 
speaking, no paradox. A paradox is "[a] statement whose truth 
leads to a contradiction and the truth of whose denial leads to a 
contradiction. "12 Suppose a judge stated that "blackmail is unlaw-
ful, and 'where a person has the right to do a certain act ... he has 
the right to threaten to do that act'13 unless paid." This statement 
7 See infra parts IV.D-E. 
8 See infra part V. 
9 See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. 
10 James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 
670-71 (1984). 
11 See id. at 670-71 & n.7. 
12 Boruch A. Brody, Logical Terms, Glossary Of. in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 57, 70 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). Colloquially, a paradox is a surprising 
conjunction-"a statement that goes against generally accepted opinion." John van 
Heijenoort, Logical Paradoxes, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 45, 
45. Blackmail is admittedly paradoxical in this looser sense. 
18 Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 557 (1983) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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contains a contradiction, 14 which completes half of the conditions 
for a paradox. To constitute a paradox, however, the statement 
must also yield a contradiction if assumed to be false. The judge's 
statement will be false if any of its components15 are false. But if 
the second portion of the judge's statement is false, it leads to no 
contradiction: If people do not invariably have a right to threaten 
to do or not do the things they are at liberty to do or not do, then 
blackmail's illegality is perfectly consistent with the larger pattern. 
Hence the statement does not produce a paradox. 
More important than the logical point is the fact that the second 
portion of the judge's statement is false. Even if one temporarily 
puts aside the complication of the blackmailer's monetary demand, 
people do not invariably have a right to threaten to do or not to do 
the things they are at liberty to do or not to do.16 Perhaps the 
mistaken opposite impression17 arises out of a belief that the 
liberty to do18 an act is inevitably greater than (and includes within 
itself) the liberty of threatening to do an act. But the right to do a 
greater thing does not always include the right to do the lesser; that 
is one of the lessons taught by the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.19 
14 Ifwe assume that the judge's statement is true, then it must be true both that 
blackmail is illegal and that what a person is legally allowed to do, that person is also 
allowed to threaten to do unless paid. But if the second part of this statement were 
true, then blackmail would be legal, which contradicts the first part of the statement. 
15 The statement can be read as having three components: (1) blackmail is 
unlawful; (2) persons lawfully can threaten to do or not do anything they lawfully may 
do or not do; and (3) the lawfulness of the threat does not alter if coupled with a 
demand for payment. 
16 See George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1617, 1618-19 (1993) (making this point and providing examples of illegal threats of 
independently legal activity). I do not mean to say that the illegality of the threatened 
action in a given case is irrelevant; in some circumstances, it may be a crucial factor. 
My point is merely that the illegality of a threatened act is not always a necessary 
condition for the illegality of a threat. CJ. F.M. Kamm, Non-consequentiali.sm, the Person 
as an Encl-in·llself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 354, 370.71 
(1992) (stating that factors that make moral differences only some of the time can 
nevertheless suffice to support a moral distinction). 
17 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 561 ("The general proposition that a party 
may threaten that which he may do makes blackmail an anomalous exception to the 
general pattern of both criminal and civil responsibility."). 
18 In usages such as this, "doing" should be read as "doing or not doing"; to 
repeat the language each time would be cumbersome. 
19 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that even though the 
government may withhold a benefit entirely, it can nevertheless be prohibited from 
offering the benefit on the condition that the recipient forgo a constitutional right. 
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 
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In addition, threatening cannot be "included" in doing because 
threatening possesses elements that doing does not. Most notably, 
threatening to disclose induces action in a way that disclosure does 
not, 20 so that doing and threatening can have quite different 
effects. This occurs in part because the two acts affect different 
parties: any threat the blackmailer makes will be directed to the 
person with the embarrassing secret, but any disclosure will be to 
third parties. In Ho hf eldian terms, a privilege21 to do would be 
distinct from a privilege to threaten since each regulates different 
relations between different people. 
Further, the blackmailer does more than merely threaten: He 
threatens to disclose unless money is paid. 22 Regardless of wheth-
er we have liberty to threaten, the law often forbids us to commod-
ify our liberties by selling them. Our liberties to make sexual use of 
our bodies cannot be bartered for cash in most states; our right to 
vote can neither be transferred gratuitously nor sold. The growing 
literature on inalienability23 makes clear that doing and selling are 
quite different issues. 
None of this should be surprising. In fact, much of the 
blackmail commentary can be organized around these simple points 
concerning the differences between doing and threatening. The 
Lindgren thesis, for example, is that blackmail is wrongful because 
the victim and blackmailer are playing with "someone else's ... 
chips. "24 This utilizes the point that doing and threatening affect 
{1989). The doctrine thus rejects "the view that the greater power to deny a benefit 
includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt." Id. 
2° For the distinction between assertions of fact on the one hand, and, on the 
other, "situation-altering" utterances and "action-inducing" utterances, see Kent 
Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1091-94 
{1983). 
21 For Hohfeld, a "privilege" is a liberty from governmental interference. See 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 30-36 {1913). 
22 A demand for money is only the paradigmatic case. The proscription against 
blackmail may also include prohibition of nonmonetary demands {such as for sexual 
compliance), which usually, but not inevitably, implicate additional concerns of 
commodification. 
25 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 {1972); MargaretJ. 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 {1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 {1985). 
24 Lindgren, supra note 10, at 702. The notion is that the information subjected 
to bargaining may properly belong, at least in part, to third parties. For example, if 
an unfaithful husband pays hush money to conceal his infidelity, the blackmailer is 
receiving compensation while the affected wife receives neither information nor 
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different parties. The economic "waste" thesis, associated with Daly 
and Giertz, 25 Coase, 26 Ginsburg and Shechtman, 27 and Ep-
stein, 28 argues that allowing blackmail threats will result in the 
expenditure of resources in allocatively-fruitless bargaining29 and 
in "digging up dirt ... and then reburying it. "30 This explanation 
incorporates the point that the dynamic effects of doing and 
threatening can be quite different. The arguments of those who 
draw upon the Bloustein thesis, that privacy should not be commod-
ified against the will of the primary party,31 correspond with the 
point that law often makes liberties inalienable.32 With each 
explanation comes another refutation of the notion that criminaliz-
ing blackmail is contradictory. At this point, perhaps only a subset 
of libertarians believe that blackmail law conflicts with other proper 
patterns of the law. 33 
Yet criminalizing blackmail still raises a number of questions. 
In the hope of both simplifying and advancing the blackmail debate, 
compensation. See id. at 702-04. 
The analysis I offer of central case blackmail does not need to posit such 
innovative rights in third parties, but instead uses traditional moral and legal 
categories to show that blackmail does a wrongful harm to the person threatened with 
release of his secret. See infra notes 80.148 and accompanying text. 
25 See George Daly & J. Fred Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency, 65 AM. 
ECON. REV. 997, 999-1001 (1975). 
26 See Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 Mccorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 
671-74 (1988) (arguing that in a world with positive transaction costs, it is undesirable 
to devote resources to activities such as blackmail which produce nothing of value). 
27 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An &onomic Analysis 
of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1865 (1993) (arguing that blackmail results in "an 
industry the output of which is nil, although resources are consumed in its 
operation"). 
28 See Epstein, supra note 13, at 561-65 (arguing that legalizing blackmail will lead 
to the creation of industries which produce nothing of value). 
29 See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 1000 ("With any positive level of bargaining 
costs, extortion will clearly lead to a reduction of social welfare since scarce resources 
are utilized in the process of negotiation while failing to improve the allocation of 
resources."). 
so Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 27, at 1860. 
31 See Edward]. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 988 (1964) ("In a community at all sensitive to 
the commercialization of human values, it is degrading to thus make a man part of 
commerce against his will."). 
32 See, e.g., Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions 
in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 
205 (1965) (stating that "[t]he criminality of blackmail represents a social judgment 
that one may not manipulate as an income-producing asset knowledge about another 
person's past"). 
llll See infra part IV.E (discussing the libertarian view). 
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I shall indicate what appears to be the central case of blackmail, and 
show why under either of the two normative views currently fighting 
for dominance in legal scholarship-economic wealth maximization 
and deontologic moral theory-central case blackmail should be 
condemned. . Central case blackmail is both inefficient (the 
economic view) and wrongful (the deontologic view).34 
II. THE CENTRAL CASE OF BLACKMAIL 
The "central case" which should inspire the most agreement is 
where the blackmailer acquires inf ormation35 for the sole purpose of 
obtaining money or other advantage from the victim, and where he has no 
intent or desire to publish the information, except as an instrument toward 
this purpose. The blackmailer's sole claim to this advantage rests on 
his possession of the information as leverage.36 
This central case appears in various guises. It describes, for 
example, Robert Nozick's paradigm of "unproductive exchange."37 
Nozick argues that an unproductive exchange has these characteris-
tics: (1) the purchaser would be better off if the seller had nothing 
at all to do with her, (2) if the exchange were impossible, "one of 
the parties to the potential exchange would be no worse off" than 
if the exchange were possible, 38 and (3) that party does not 
deserve to have the other party harm her. 39 Clearly the victim of 
my central case meets all of these criteria: she would be better off 
if the seller of silence were out of her life, and if the money-for-
silence exchange were impossible she would be no worse off 
because the blackmailer would then not have bothered either to 
acquire the information or to make a threat of disclosure. 40 (In 
fact, the victim would be better off if exchanges of money for 
54 Whether or not the blackmail act should be criminalized is a separate inquiry. 
See infra part V. 
35 Types of extortion other than blackmail involve leverage other than the threat 
to reveal information. 
36 My definition of central case blackmail does not include cases where the 
blackmail is motivated by a desire to reform the behavior of the threatened party. 
37 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-86 (1974). 
38 Id. at 85. For a discussion of the importance of this second condition, see infra 
note 140. 
39 This third characteristic is implied rather than directly stated. See NOZICK, supra 
note 37, at 84 (distinguishing the case where "I deserved to be harmed by you") 
(emphasis omitted). 
40 Jeffrie Murphy essentially utilizes Nozick's theory in defending the criminali-
zation of such a case. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 THE 
MONIST 156, 163-66 (1980). 
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silence were impossible.) As for the third condition, there is 
nothing in the description of central case blackmail that suggests the 
victim has done something to the blackmailer that would give the 
blackmailer basis for a corrective justice claim against her;41 in 
central case blackmail the threatener knows of a victim's discredit-
able act not because the threatener was himself harmed by it, but 
rather because he sought out the information for purposes of 
financial leverage. So all of Nozick's three conditions are met. 
Kent Greenawalt's definition of "manipulative threat" also 
captures the central case: manipulative threats are "threats of 
action when the actor would not suggest or engage in the action 
were it not for the threat itself and its linkage to a demand. "42 In 
such instances, "the possibility of [disclosure] has come into 
existence only as a part of a plan to induce" the victim to act as the 
blackmailer desires.48 
The central case also plays a central role in the economic 
analyses. The entrepreneurs of Richard Epstein's "Blackmail, Inc." 
are by definition persons who go into the information business 
precisely to obtain material to use as leverage;44 they have no 
independent interest in disclosure aside from maintaining the 
credibility of their threats. Instead they intend to bind themselves, 
via contract with the victim, into not using the very resources they 
have expended money to locate. Similarly, Coase45 and Ginsburg 
41 Although Nozick addresses the issue only obliquely, principles of corrective 
justice suggest that the issue is whether the victim deserves to be harmed in this 
particular way by this particular person, not whether the victim might deserve to be 
harmed in some way by someone. See Ernest Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428-38, 444-50 (1987) (corrective justice necessarily requires 
a relationship between doer and sufferer); see also infra note 130. 
42 Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1099. Greenawalt's category has some 
divergences from central case blackmail that are not relevant for the instant 
discussion. 
4s Id. at 1098. 
44 See Epstein, supra note 13, at 561-66. The argument here is perhaps more 
properly attributed to Coase, Ginsburg and Shechtman, and Daly and Giertz. See 
generally Coase, supra note 26; George Daly & J. Fred Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, 
and Efficiency: Reply, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 736, 736 (1978); Ginsburg & Shechtman, 
supra note 27. Epstein's argument against blackmail focused on a different aspect, 
namely, the way a blackmailer assists the victim in defrauding the public. See Epstein, 
supra note 13, at 561-66. Nevertheless, Epstein's apt image of "Blackmail, Inc.," 
captures the imagination. 
45 See Coase, supra note 26, at 674 ("It would be better if this [blackmail] 
information were not collected and the resources were used to produce something 
of value."). 
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and Shechtman46 worry about people expending resources in 
gathering information they have no intention of ever using except 
as a lever with which to extract an unproductive transfer payment. 
Daly and Giertz mal~e a related point from a similar paradigmatic 
case: "The victim of extortion is forced to compensate the 
perpetrator to refrain from doing something which does not directly 
benefit anyone and would not be undertaken save for its bribe 
generating potential. "47 The reasons why the economists view 
such a central case as wasteful are fairly obvious, and are briefly 
spelled out in the next section. 
Ill. A CONSEQUENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE 
A. The Economic Argument: Allocative and 
Nonallocative Effects 
The common law does not ordinarily allow persons to bring suit 
for recompense when they take actions that avert harm to others. 
Among other things, such suits would be difficult to implement, 48 
would involve high administrative costs, and could, because of 
problems such as valuation, impose net harms on the supposed 
recipients of the harm-reducing activity.49 
Ordinarily, however, persons are permitted to bargain over the 
potentially harmful acts they are free to perform, 50 and by contract 
46 See Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 27, at 1859. 
47 Daly & Giertz, supra note 44, at 736; see also Daly & Giertz, supra note 25 (by 
implication). 
48 Consider, for example, the difficult question of how to determine the amount 
of monetary recovery a harm-avoider should receive. If the court were to use as a 
measure the amount of damage the claimant refrained from inflicting, it would not 
only introduce intractable evidentiary problems (how badly would the claimant have 
acted?), but could also encourage potential claimants to create a record of prior bad 
acts, to provide themselves with a plausible baseline for seeking reward. In addition, 
there are probably intractable problems of coordination in choosing the proper 
persons to encourage or reward; in some situations virtually the entire public is 
capable of claiming that they have refrained from inflicting harm. For an exploration 
of these and other implementation problems, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Hanns and 
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 455-56 
(1992); see also Donald Wittman, Liability for Hann or Restitution for Benefit1, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 57, 62-64 (1984) (illustrating the difficulty of calculating money owed 
when one has a "situation of no damage" but rather the avoidance of harm). 
49 See Gordon, supra note 48, at 455-62. In addition, allowing restitutionary rights 
for harm-avoidance could generate incentives for extortion. See id. at 457-58. 
5° For example, a person who decides not to build a sun-blocking fence out of 
consideration for his sun-loving neighbor cannot sue to obtain a reward for his 
1993] TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1749 
can obtain recompense for refraining from those acts. Contract 
provides few implementation problems, low administrative costs, 
and less likelihood that a contracting party will suffer a net harm. 
Most importantly, the allocative effects of such contracts are 
positive, as is made clear by the Coasean rationale for allowing and 
enforcing such contracts. From an economic perspective, it is 
desirable to distribute both exclusive rights and nonexclusive 
privileges where they are most "highly valued" (that is, where they 
can be used most productively). But the law cannot make these 
allocations perfectly. If a person adversely affected by a liberty 
values freedom from its effects more than the liberty-holder values 
its exercise, the person affected should be free to purchase the 
liberty from the person who values it less, thus correcting the initial 
misallocation. 
Unlike the standard transaction, central case blackmail ordinarily 
does not (and by definition is not intended to) trigger a reallocation 
of the contested resource. The blackmailer does not wish to 
disclose, but only to extract a transfer payment. If, as economists 
Daly and Giertz assume, the amount of money the victim would be 
willing to pay is solely a function of the blackmailer's ability to 
inflict injury to her reputation,51 and if the central case assump-
tion holds that disclosure has no independent value to the seller/ 
blackmailer, the purchaser will probably purchase silence if 
blackmail is legal.52 Admittedly, strategic behavior might some-
times interfere with the parties' attainment of this mutually 
beneficial result.53 But as a general matter, allowing central case 
forbearance. He can choose, however, to negotiate over the fence's height, and 
demand consideration from his neighbor in exchange for keeping the fence low. 
As to those acts which the potential seller is not legally free to perform, the other 
party ordinarily can bring suit to restrain or obtain compensation for them. Of 
course, some willingness to pay for harm-avoidance may remain (due to the 
inadequacies of prospective legal restraint and after-the-fact compensation), but it is 
usually unlawful for a potential harm-causer to demand payment in exchange for 
refraining from unlawful acts. 
51 See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 & fig.I (schedule DD) (graphing the 
correlation between victim payments and the blackmailer's ability to injure). Daly and 
Giertz recognize that the real motivations may be more complex. See id. at 998 n.2 
(recognizing the possibility that the victim could suffer a greater loss than "the 
resources he gives up to the extortionist"). 
52 See id. at 9Q8 (explaining the likelihood of "successful negotiations"). By 
contrast, if blackmail is not legal, the victim has leverage with which to refuse 
purchase. See infra part V.A.1. 
55 For example, the blackmailer may overestimate the price the victim would be 
willing to pay and "dig in" at an unrealistic demand level. If this happens, the 
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blackmail in a world of positive transaction costs would waste 
resources in bargaining or investigation without any allocative 
payoff.54 
B. The Irrelevance of Lawful or Beneficial Nature 
of the Threatened Action 
The initial "paradox" involved the fact that the blackmailer 
threatened to do an act that was itself lawful and, by implication, 
beneficial. 55 The foregoing discussion should make clear that the 
beneficial or harmful nature of the action threatened is irrelevant 
to the core economic argument against central case blackmail. In 
central.case blackmail, the threatened action has no independent 
positive value for either party.56 What motivates the bargain 
exchange of money for silence will not occur, notwithstanding the fact that the 
blackmailer could have benefitted from selling his silence at a far lower figure. 
54 See Coase, supra note 26, at 671 (same); Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 1000 
(stating that extortion consumes resources through costs of negotiation with no 
accompanying improvement in resource allocation, resulting in a net decrease in 
social welfare); Daly & Giertz, supra note 44, at 736 (same); Ginsburg & Shechtman, 
supra note 27, at 1863-64 (same). 
Lindgren has characterized this argument as resting on the comparative 
magnitude of the transaction costs involved in a standard transaction as compared to 
a blackmail transaction. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 695-97 (comparing 
transactions costs in "blackmail bargaining" and "legitimate bargaining"). He 
therefore argues that the argument cannot be advanced without empirical proof of 
how great the transaction costs in each type of interaction might be. See id. But 
comparison among absolute levels of transaction costs seems besides the point, at 
least as to central case blackmail occurring between economically motivated actors. 
In such a nonallocative transaction, any transaction cost is too much. When the time 
comes to integrate the ideal central case into a more realistic picture of costs and 
benefits, then Lindgren's point becomes more relevant. 
For some of the noneconomic distinctions between standard and blackmail 
transactions, see infra part IV.E. 
55 Note that the discussion here addresses the beneficial nature of the threatened 
action and does not separately consider its lawfulness. That is because I am assuming 
that in assessing the "blackmail paradox," the lawfulness of disclosure would have 
meaning for the economist merely as an indirect indicator that disclosure yielded 
more benefits than costs. 
The analysis would be more complex if we were to take into account the 
possibility that any criminalization of a threat to do a lawful act would itself have 
negative consequences. For example, such criminalization may cause confusion or 
erode respect for the law. I give no attention to these possibilities since I think that 
criminalizing central case blackmail has no such consequences, largely because the 
person on the street perceives blackmail to be a wrong; therefore, criminalization of 
the activity evokes no sense of inconsistency. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 553 
(referring to the "popular sentiment" for criminalizing blackmail). 
56 The blackmailer may have some interest in disclosure in order to make the 
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instead is that the action will have a negative value to the person 
threatened which is greater than the null or negative57 value it has 
for the threatener. 58 In such a context, it is in no one's interest 
for the threat of disclosure to be carried out, and therefore, if the 
parties are economically motivated, 59 making the threat will not 
direct resources toward carrying out the threatened act. The fact 
that the action will not take place renders unnecessary any assess-
ment of the costs or benefits of the threatened act. 60 
C. Caveat: Dynamic Economic Effects of Legalizing 
Central Case Blackmail 
The above argument suggested that because central case 
blackmailers will be paid to refrain from disclosure, their threats will 
not result in an ultimate change in the allocation of the contested 
information. Real-world effects will necessarily be more complex. 
For example, legalization could increase not only instances of 
central case blackmail, but also the number of cases where black-
mailers have affirmative and independent motives to disclose.61 
threat offurther disclosure credible, but disclosure has leverage value to him only by 
virtue of the possibility of his contracting with the victim. See, e.g., Daly &: Giertz, 
supra note 25, at 998 (including the "externality generating party" who receives no 
direct benefits as one of the explicit features of their model}. This leverage value is 
thus not an independent positive value to the single-instance, central-case blackmailer. 
57 Carrying out the threat may be costly to the extortioner, in which case the 
threatened action is a net negative to both the victim and the blackmailer. See Daly 
&: Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 &: fig. 1 (depicting marginal benefits and damages). 
58 Strictly speaking, a blackmail bargain could occur even if disclosure were more 
costly to the blackmailer than to the victim, so long as the blackmailer could conceal 
this fact and "bluff' the other into paying for silence. 
59 By "economically motivated" I mean to indicate that the amount of money the 
victim would be willing to pay is solely a function of the injury to her reputation the 
blackmailer is in a position to inflict, and that the blackmailer's sole motives are 
minimizing his costs (of research and the like) and maximizing the payoff he receives 
from the victim. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
If the parties are not economically motivated in this sense, then the analysis is 
more complex. Such a situation could occur if "honor" has an economic dimension 
that could dictate whether the victim rejects the blackmail deal. The standard 
economic case on the "waste" of blackmail depends on the assumption that the 
parties' demand structures will usually lead to a deal where silence is purchased. 
60 For example, the model of the Daly and Giertz paper was originally intended 
to address extortion by threat of violence. See Daly&: Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 
(discussing extortion). Though violence is action which is unlawful and whose 
consequences are negative, the Daly and Giertz model equally well describes the 
supply and demand structure of central case blackmail. See Daly&: Giertz, supra note 
44, at 736 n.2 ("It should be noted that the key feature of extortion is the use of a 
threat to elicit a payment, not whether the threatened action is legal or illegal."). 
61 Ifblackmail were legalized, persons or corporations might develop a systematic 
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When disclosure has an independent positive value to blackmail-
ers, 62 disclosure in a particular case might be worth more to the 
blackmail entrepreneur than silence is worth to the victim. If so, 
blackmail efforts may be unsuccessful, and disclosure (reallocation 
of the information) might result. Such disclosure might sometimes 
be more socially valuable than silence would have been. For 
another example, Professor William Landes and Judge Richard 
Posner have suggested that successful blackmail may have a positive 
long-term allocative effect on resources other than information, in 
that fear of having to make blackmail payments may induce 
potential nonconformists to conform their behavior to majority 
standards. 63 This observation applies even to central case black-
mail. 
Of course, the fact that blackmail may result in some deterrence 
or disclosure is not fatal to the consequentialist case for its 
criminalization. Persons will engage in blackmail only if they expect 
the activity will yield a payoff in purchased silence-and all silence-
yielding (nonallocative) transactions will impose transaction costs 
that could well outweigh any beneficial disclosure resulting from 
blackmail attempts that misfire. Further, the possible allocative 
effect resulting from occasional disclosure or deterrence is not 
guaranteed to be beneficial. Disclosure may have a social value that 
is positive (for example, disclosing to the electorate that a mayor has 
embezzled funds) or negative (for example, making public a secret 
practice of blackmail, and they might need to establish a reputation for carrying out 
their threats. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 562 (predicting "an open and public 
market for a new set of social institution to exploit the gains" if blackmail were 
legalized). 
62 When this happens, such blackmail is definitionally outside the "central case." 
Unlike the "central case" blackmailer, the company seeking to convince the public of 
its power and ruthlessness has a reason to gather and disclose information that is 
independent from the threat to the individual subject of the information. See Coase, 
supra note 26, at 675. This does not mean one can exclude the credibility motive 
from discussion, however, since the two kinds ofblackmail are likely to arise together. 
From a deontological perspective, this kind of blackmail would be treated the 
same as central case blackmail. In central case blackmail, the threatener intends to 
injure the person who does not want the information disclosed. In credibility-
motivated disclosure, this person is an object of the blackmailer's harm, but so are 
third parties (prospective victims) whom the blackmailer intends to harm. Since the 
credibility-seeking blackmailer is disclosing only as a tool to aid him in unjustifiably 
hurting others, the deontologic argument against him remains strong. See infra part 
IV. 
68 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975). For background, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231-58, 268-86 (1981). 
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of no public import that causes deep distress in the family con-
cerned, such as the fact that when the mayor was a child he was 
sexually abused by a relative). It is similarly possible that blackmail-
induced conformity might involve a net cost to society.64 Also, 
Landes and Posner suggest that efficiency considerations of 
governmental versus private law enforcement may justify criminali-
zation regardless of the extent to which blackmail could deter 
inefficient acts. 65 
The waste inherent in central case blackmail should lie at the 
core of the economic analysis. Nevertheless, when an economic 
assessment of criminalization needs to be made, instances of central 
case blackmail should not be viewed in isolation, both because other 
kinds of blackmail will arise that may be difficult to distinguish from 
it, and because the dynamic effects of successful central case 
64 I suspect that institutions such as Blackmail, Inc. would primarily discourage 
harmless behavior that happens to be nonconforming (for example, same-gender 
sexual relations). Our society already makes harmless and nonconforming behavior 
too expensive. If so, legalization would then have negative long·term allocative 
effects, along with the previously discussed waste of transactional and investigative 
resources. 
One might argue that this is a contestable value judgment, and that as an 
economic matter such costs are appropriately imposed on the nonconforming activity. 
For example, if the public disapproves of an act, it might be argued that the 
"disutility" caused the public by their knowledge of the act's occurrence should be 
imposed upon the actors as a sort of strict liability, much as the injuries that 
hazardous activities cause are imposed on the activities as a "cost of doing business." 
There are however several problems with such an argument. 
First, determining "what is a cost of what" is not a simple factual judgment. 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 133, 
133-73 (1970). The cost to the public of knowing that persons are engaging in a 
disapproved activity is produced by a combination of the public's taste and the 
persons' behavior. It may be more appropriate to let the public bear the "cost" of its 
taste than to impose it on the persons whose behavior, when combined with the 
public taste, causes the offense. An economist would probably ask, "who is the 
cheapest cost avoider." See id at 135. Since tastes about others' sexual behavior or 
orientation are easier to change than one's own behavior or orientation, I suspect the 
public is a cheaper cost avoider in this case. My rebuttal here is, of course, a two-
penny version of a now-standard utilitarian defense of sheltering consensual adult 
sexual relations from legal regulation. See JOHNS. MILL, ON LIBER'IY 91-103 (Currin 
V. Shields ed., 1956). 
Second, so long as the harmless behavior is not disclosed (and in central case 
blackmail it would indeed remain secret), there are few if any costs to the public. 
Reducing or increasing the number of potentially offensive acts would not affect the 
costs to a public unaware of them. 
65 See Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 42 (indicating that criminalizing 
blackmail may stem from "the decision to rely on a public monopoly" in criminal law 
enforcement). 
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blackmail may result in changing the behavior of persons who might 
fear blackmail in the future. 
D. Imperfect Knowledge 
Given the above complications, it might be argued that allowing 
blackmail data to be bought and sold is the best way to finesse the 
economic unknowns. After all, markets supposedly incorporate the 
decentralized knowledge of many parties to direct resources to their 
highest valued uses, even when those uses may be unknown to 
central decisionmakers.66 The Coase theorem teaches that in a 
properly functioning market, absent transaction costs, people will 
trade a resource until it reaches its highest valued use regardless of 
where the government initially assigns its ownership.67 If transac-
tion costs are reasonably low and if the theorem holds, it might be 
argued that allowing blackmail transactions will simultaneously tell 
us whether disclosure or silence is optimal and move us to the 
optimal result. 
However, in blackmail the transaction costs can be so high as to 
preclude all the affected parties from making their preferences 
known through the market, thus preventing transactions from 
reliably directing resources to their highest valued uses. For 
example, there may be a multitude of voters who would be willing 
to pay something to learn that their mayor has embezzled public 
funds. Yet a person who has this information cannot practicably 
contact this mass of possible buyers; even if he could, freerider 
strategic behavior could well fores tall agreement, 68 particularly 
when coupled with the well-recognized difficulties that accompany 
any attempt to sell a secret to people ignorant of its content.69 
Because of these difficulties that are well known to affect markets 
in information and other intellectual products, most of the societal 
66 This classic argument is usually attributed to Hayek. See Friedrich A. Hayek, 
The Use of Knowledge in Society 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524-25 {1945) (arguing that 
decentralized decisionmaking can often utilize knowledge better than centralized 
planning). 
67 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 
(1960); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1990). 
68 Such problems might be avoided if there were a journalistic market that paid 
for "tips" an amount equivalent to what the citizens would pay in a competitive 
market. 
69 See Gordon, supra note 48, at 475-77 (examining the difficulties that would 
beset the seller of an intellectual product if he had no rights to prevent copying). 
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benefits that could flow from disclosure are likely to be kept external 
to the blackmailer's decision. If so, the outcome of dealings among 
blackmailer, victim, and other possible buyers will prove unreliable 
as a guide to societal economic welfare. 
Even if the transaction cost and strategic behavior problems 
could be overcome, blackmail raises an additional problem for 
application of the Coase theorem. For certain fundamental 
resources, the location of the highest valued use can vary with the 
law's assignment of initial entitlements. These are the resources 
whose possession can affect our ability to enjoy all other goods. 
Plausible examples include life, sight, and one's standing in a 
community of peers. The fact that the valuation of these resources 
can depend on the law is a result of the "wealth effect" that 
ownership has on one's ability to express one's preferences in the 
market. 70 Ronald Coase himself realized that changes in the 
allocation of rights concerning fundamental resources (such as the 
abolition of slaveowners' rights over other human beings) could 
affect the final allocation of goods even in a world without transac-
tion costs.71 Herbert Hovenkamp goes so far as to argue that the 
absence of wealth effects is one of the premises of the Coase 
theorem. 72 Reputation may well be one of those fundamental 
resources with strong wealth effects. 
The wealth effect phenomenon does not afflict central case 
blackmail because, regardless of initial allocations, both parties 
pref er nondisclosure and will negotiate to achieve it. 78 However, 
70 See infra note 84 (discussing the phenomenon of"wealth" or "income" effects). 
71 See RONALD H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET, AND THE LAW 157, 173-74 (1988) (commenting, however, that wealth effects 
"will normally be so insignificant that they can safely be neglected"). 
72 See Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 787. Hovenkamp also notes, however, that 
the Coase theorem can be interpreted as having two parts: an "efficiency thesis" 
which says that resources will end up in their highest valued uses regardless of how 
legal rights are allocated, and an "invariance thesis" which says that resources will also 
end up in the same uses regardless of how legal rights are allocated. See id. at 785. 
Wealth effects are technically relevant only to the invariance thesis. As for the first 
thesis, actors in a world without transaction costs will still reach efficient results even 
if strong wealth effects exist. although what constitutes efficient resource use may well 
be different when the allocation of legal rights shifts. 
7s Regardless of who starts out with rights over the information, in central case 
blackmail silence will be the end result of the transaction (that is, silence will be the 
highest valued use of the information as between blackmailer and victim) because the 
value of disclosure is not positive for either party. See supra notes 50-59 and 
accompanying text. 
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in the more analytically troubling cases where disclosure has some 
independent positive value to the blackmailer, the wealth effect 
makes the market an unreliable indicator of the location of the 
information's highest valued use.74 In fact, for those fundamental 
resources which implicate strong wealth effects, one cannot speak 
of the highest valued use except in the context of a particular 
allocative starting point.75 
To illustrate how the highest valued use may vary with the 
allocation of legal rights, assume for example that a right of privacy 
shields a celebrity's disastrous secret76 so that the celebrity has a 
kind of ownership in the information. If a neighbor learns the 
secret and wishes to make it into a docudrama to sell to the 
networks, and if she needs the celebrity's permission to do so, then 
the celebrity may be unwilling to give permission no matter how 
much money the neighbor offers. If so, the highest valued use of 
the information seems to be silence. 
However, if we assume instead that the celebrity does not own 
the information-if, for example, the jurisdiction's right to privacy 
does not protect secrets of this type or does not extend to docudra-
mas 77-the neighbor who learned the secret no longer needs to ask 
Where the highest valued use is known, usual economic wisdom suggests the 
resource should be initially assigned to that use. Blackmail law produces an 
analogous result: though it does not assign the victim a right to silence (for when 
parties other than the blackmailer are concerned, disclosure might be the higher-
valued use), it instead prohibits the central case blackmailer from selling the victim 
her liberty of disclosure. As between those two parties, the transaction is not 
allocatively effective, since the central case blackmailer will always sell and silence will 
always result. 
74 Assume that the value of disclosure is positive for the blackmailer (e.g., she has 
markets for the information in addition to the victim). If she has both the liberty to 
disclose and a power to sell that liberty to anyone she wants, she will have a minimum 
price beneath which she will not sell-and the person who is the subject of the 
information may not have enough money or borrowing power to meet that price. 
Such noncentral types of blackmail are thus potentially afflicted with strong wealth 
effects. These blackmail cases are more difficult to evaluate from an economic 
persfective, for these instances may produce disclosures that benefit third parties. 
7 To decide what is the best use for such resources, it is necessary to utilize a 
criterion (perhaps "utility") other than the usual economic criterion of "value" 
measured by willingness to pay. 
76 Wealth effects strong enough to cause variation in highest valued use will occur 
primarily with negative reputational information. Neutral or positive reputational 
information is likely to have a constant highest valued use regardless of initial 
allocation, except where the party concerned has a particularly strong desire for 
privacy. 
77 The docudrama issue remains unresolved within right of publicity doctrine. 
Such a suit was reportedly brought by Elizabeth Taylor. See Tamar Levin, Whose Life 
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permission. Instead, she may give the celebrity a choice between 
disclosure or paying the equivalent of what a network would pay for 
the story. Against this legal background, the celebrity is limited in 
his ability to protect his reputation by the amount of money he 
possesses or can borrow. If the celebrity does not have enough 
money to outbid the network, then the highest valued use of the 
information would now· seem to be publication, even if all that has 
changed is the initial assignment of rights. 
As I have argued elsewhere, an economist should not give the 
market her usual deference in situations where the allocative 
outcome of bargaining will depend on the initial assignment of 
ownership rights. 78 Of course, this argument suggests only that we 
should not rely on the market to inform us what the best use is for 
some kinds of resources; the argument does not itself tell us 
anything about what the best use should be. Outside the instance 
of central case blackmail, economists might well debate to whom the 
relevant rights should be assigned.79 Nevertheless, to the extent 
that the market is unable to make determinate choices regarding the 
highest valued use of resources such as one's good reputation, we 
know that outlawing blackmail deprives us of relatively little in the 
way of meaningful information. The only determinate answer likely 
to be provided by the market is with respect to central case 
blackmail: whatever the initial allocation, the parties will likely opt 
for silence. As to that case, then, the market analysis provides 
useful economic information, and that information supports 
criminalization. 
Is It, Anyway'! Legally, It's Hard to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1982, § 2, at 1 (discussing 
Taylor's suit and the confrontation between the right of publicity and First 
Amendment doctrine); see also Jane Hall, When a Life Is Public, How Much Is Private'!, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, § F, at 1 (reporting that Taylor's suit did not go to trial 
and a planned docudrama was dropped "for creative reasons"). 
78 See Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a jurisprudence of Benefits: The Nonns of Copyright 
and the Probkm of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 104243 (1990) (book 
review). 
79 For example, as between the news media and someone seeking to use his right 
of publicity or his copyright as an instrument of private censorship, it may be best to 
place the entitlement in the media. See id. 
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IV. A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST MORAL VIEW 
A. Background 
I suspect that policymakers prohibit blackmail less because of 
economic waste or inefficiency than because they perceive the act 
of blackmail to be wrong in itself. Yet the nonconsequential case 
for blackmail's wrongfulness has not yet been clearly stated. In one 
of the first and most interesting articles on modern blackmail 
theory, Jeffrie Murphy suggested that the deontological case against 
blackmail might have intractable difficulties. 80 Even Robert 
Nozick, usually thought of as a deontologic theorist, has grounded 
his blackmail argument on the idea of "unproductive exchanges, "81 
a rationale that sounds in consequentialism and whose deontological 
rationale is opaque. A number of commentators have asked why it 
is wrong for an exchange to be "unproductive" in Nozick's sense, 82 
and the literature has provided no apparent answer. 83 
Yet to me the deontologic case against blackmail seems clear. 
One person deliberately seeks to harm another to serve her own 
ends-to exact money or other advantage-and does so in a context 
where she has no conceivable justification for her act. Admittedly, 
the sum that the victim pays a blackmailer lacks economic significance 
because it is a "mere" transfer payment that has virtually no 
systematic allocative effect, 84 but from a deontologic perspective 
80 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162-63. 
81 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84-86. 
82 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 158 ("It is not obvious on its face ••• that 
unproductive economic exchanges are immoral. Nozick gives no such argument and 
I am skeptical that one can be given."); cf. Lindgren, supra note 10, at 700 ("If 
blackmail is an unproductive exchange, it is certainly not unproductive in the sense 
Nozick intends."). 
ss Standing alone, Nozick's paradigm of"unproductive exchange" is an insufficient 
explanation of blackmail's wrongfulness. But when it is subjected to a few alterations, 
the "unproductive exchange" paradigm can provide a definition of"harm" useful for 
the blackmail context. See infra part IV.E.2. The notion of "harm," in turn, 
constitutes an essential link in this Article's argument that blackmail is wrongful 
because it constitutes an intentional unjustified harm to a justified holding. 
84 Transfers ofincome can have indirect allocative effects if the parties' respective 
demand for goods shifts due to their change in income. See, e.g., EJ. Mishan, The 
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 18-21 
(1971) (illustrating the income or wealth effects that allocating rights has on the 
valuation of environmental spillovers). While a loss of reputation would likely have 
significant wealth effects, see discussion supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text, loss 
of money may not. 
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the transfer payment provides the key to the whole analysis. The 
nature of the weapon the blackmailer uses to obtain her payment-
that her threat of disclosure is a threat to do something lawful-
tends to obscure this from view. But the fact that the threat relates 
to the disclosure of information is no more than a red herring.85 
The blackmailer is concerned with the nature of the threat she 
employs only in the instrumental way that a butcher is concerned 
with what knife to use. 86 
To demonstrate the irrelevance of the threatened act from a 
nonconsequentialist perspective of blackmail, I will employ the 
"doctrine of double effect."87 Once the nature of the blackmail-
er's act is stripped clear with the analogical aid of that doctrine, 
blackmail can be seen simply as an unjustified intentional infliction 
of harm on another to benefit one's self. 
B. Means and Ends 
Economics, act-utilitarianism, and other forms of consequential-
ist normative inquiry take an "impartial" or objective view of reality. 
Their norms are agent-neutral; the only question in such systems is 
what outcomes should obtain. 88 By contrast, there are duty-
oriented or "deontological" perspectives that ask how outcomes are 
arrived at. The deontological perspective is sometimes said to be 
The money paid by the blackmail victim is likely to have significant allocative 
"income effects" if, for example, the amount happens to constitute a very high 
percentage of the assets or the income stream of one of the parties. However, if the 
blackmail payment is not very large, its transfer will probably have no significant 
allocative results; if so, from an economic perspective, it would not matter who owns 
the money. 
Even if the size of the payment is great enough to cause income effects, it will 
be difficult to analyze the allocative effects in any systematic way. (Would the victims 
of successful blackmail switch from Cadillacs to Tercels while successful blackmailers 
switched from Escorts to BMWs?) Even if such income effects exist, therefore, they 
would be hard to predict and thus not useful for an economic analysis of blackmail. 
85 Manipulative threats may not even be communications. Greenawalt has argued 
that such a threat is a type of action, and possesses a "situation-altering character 
[that] takes it outside the scope of expression," at least for some purposes. 
Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1099. 
86 The violent and unlawful nature of a threatened act may make the extortionist's 
moral wrong more serious ("I will break your legs" as compared with "I will disclose 
your secret"), but a threat may constitute a moral wrong even if the threatened act 
is neither wrongful nor unlawful. 
87 See infra text accompanying notes 105-06. 
88 My discussion comparing objective and subjective perspectives on morality is 
much indebted to THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 165-88 (1986). 
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the perspective of the agent by whose acts the outcomes are 
achieved;89 it is in that way subjective. To the actor, it matters not 
only that the ultimate outcome of an act may be good, but also 
whether she will in the process have to do an act that is wrong90-
and wrongness is not determined solely by reference to ultimate 
outcomes. Rather, the core of the dominant deontologic view holds 
that it is wrong to treat another as a means rather than as an end in 
himself, "to treat someone as if he existed for purposes he does not 
share."91 
To transfer unjustifiably another's benefit to one's self is 
particularly wrongful, for it denies the fundamental equality of 
persons so to prefer one's self over another. But under the strict 
deontologic view, it is also wrongful to use another person to 
achieve a beneficial outcome for many. This principle almost 
certainly has some popular recognition; most of us would hesitate 
to do significant injury to an innocent even if the result were to give 
succor to an entire city.92 The duty not to harm the innocent is 
considered a binding side-constraint on an agent's pursuit of good 
outcomes. 93 
89 Although some commentators consider rule utilitarianism a form of deontology, 
see, e.g., Robert G. Olson, Deontological Ethics, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY, supra note 12, at 343, the discussion here assumes a Kant-oriented deontological 
approach. Note also that the deontological perspective is only one of several types 
of ai!f,ent-relativity. See NAGEL, supra note 88, at 165-67. 
Nagel states that "[d]eontological reasons have their full force against your 
doinf something-not just against its happening." NAGEL, supra note 88, at 177. 
9 Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intention, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double 
Effect, in JOHN M. FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES 179, 
190 n.25 (1992) (applying a Kantian approach). 
92 If this were not so, there would be little difficulty regarding Ivan Karamazov's 
famous question: 
Tell me yourself, I challenge you-answer. Imagine that you are creating a 
fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, 
giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to 
torture to death only one tiny creature-that little child ••• and to found 
that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect 
under those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth. 
FYODOR DOSTOEVSKI, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 226 (Constance Garnett trans., 
1976) (1880). 
Admittedly, there are many ways to argue that the perception that we are morally 
constrained in such cases is false consciousness. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 88, at 186-87 
(discussing whether any pursuit of objective ethics depends on false consciousness). 
93 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 28-35. 
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From a deontologic perspective, blackmail is a harm that 
impugns the worth of the targeted individual,94 using his welfare 
as a mere tool for another's advancement. Thomas Nagel observes: 
The deontological constraint ..• expresses the direct appeal to the 
point of view of the agent from the point of view of the person on 
whom he is acting. It operates through that relation. The victim feels 
outrage when he is deliberately harmed ... not simply because of 
the quantity of the harm but because of the assault on his value of 
having my actions guided by his evil.95 
Acts of unjustified intentional harm are thus the perversion of the 
personal. Blackmail is one such act, 96 and as such is for bidden by 
the central deontologic constraint. 
C. Intent, Consequences, and the Doctrine of Double Effect 
As mentioned, deontologic approaches usually stress the duties 
that exist independently of the consequences they cause. It is said, 
for example, that one person should never use another solely as a 
means, 97 which can be taken to imply that no unconsented harm 
should be done to another regardless of the good to be produced 
by the actor's overall goal. Some deontological philosophers, 
however, distinguish between direct and oblique intention, 98 
between foreseen and intended effects,99 or among effects that 
vary in their degree of "closeness" with the intended effect.100 
9.f CJ. Kamm, supra note 16 (exploring certain connections between moral duty 
and status). 
95 NAGEL, supra note 88, at 184 (emphasis added). 
96 George Fletcher argues that a crucial harm done in blackmail is the relation of 
dominance which the criminal forces on the victim. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 
1626-28. His presentation persuasively suggests that the deontological insult-the 
blackmailer's perversion of the relation that should exist between subjective agents, 
that each treat the other as an end and not a means-has a psychological dimension 
of great immediacy. 
97 For instance, Kant writes that one should "[a]ct in such a way that you always 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (HJ. Paton trans., Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. 1964) (1948). Of course, Kant's views are open to many differing 
interJ>retations. 
9 See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double 
Effect, in FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 91, at 59, 61 (applying Bentham's distinction 
between direct and oblique intent to the doctrine of double effect). 
99 See Kamm, supra note 16, at 376-78. 
100 See, e.g., Foot, supra note 98, at 61-62 (discussing formulating a criterion of 
closeness); Quinn, supra note 91, at 182 (discussing Hart's critique of"closeness" and 
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Where a consequence is not directly intended, 1°1 the deontologi-
cal constraints may apply with less force. 
The usefulness of the distinction can be illustrated by looking at 
the kind of puzzle that has long fascinated Guido Calabresi: Why 
is it that our society spends much more to save named individuals-
spending a fortune to rescue a child who has fallen down a nearly-
inaccessible well, for example, or a bridge worker caught under a 
fallen girder-than we do on safety precautions that would avoid the 
same amount of harm (or even more) to unknown but statistically 
certain individuals?102 The most obvious explanation of these 
phenomena is a deontological distinction between direct and 
indirect intention, between the certainty of a known event and the 
indefiniteness of the merely foreseeable: it is morally worse to turn 
one's back on a known person with real suffering than to ignore the 
odds that in a distant place an unknown person will die.108 
A key attraction of the deontologic perspective is its focus on 
the relation between the actor's intent and the personhood of the 
the doctrine of double effect). The various distinctions mentioned (foreseen/ 
intended, close/ not close, and direct/ oblique) are verbal attempts to capture similar 
concepts. 
101 The philosophers are using "intent" as it appears in ordinary language, rather 
than as a torts lawyer would use the term. Under the Restatement (Second) ofTorts, 
an actor "intends" all those results which he knows his actions are nubstantially certain 
to bring about. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 8A (1964 )("The word 'intent' 
is used .•• to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that 
he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.") 
(emphasis added). For the philosophers, by contrast, mere knowledge that a bad 
result will follow does not suffice to constitute direct intention. 
102 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: 
PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 6 (1985). 
tos The deontological view may also explain other puzzles. Jurors in tort cases 
charging corporations with dangerous product designs may be more likely to find 
liability and/ or award large punitive damages against the corporation if its officers 
had engaged in explicit calculations of costs and benefits. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford 
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361-62, 381-83 (1981) (describing the aggravating 
effect of Ford's explicit balancing of the cost of deaths from design features of the 
Ford Pinto against the minimal cost of increasing the car's safety); CALABRESI, supra 
note 102, at 184 n.322 (discussingjury's reaction to cost-benefit analysis in Grimshaw); 
Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Public's Costly Mistrust of Cost-Benefit Safety Analysis, NAT'L 
LJ., Oct. 13, 1980, at 26, 26 (discussing the paradigmatic Pinto prosecution "where 
persons from virtually all sectors expressed their antipathy for the use of cost-benefit 
analysis where safety is in issue"). This surprises many, for the tort system itself is 
widely viewed as implementing a cost/benefit calculus. See WILLIAM M. LANDES &: 
RICHARD M. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 (1987). One 
explanation may be that jurors share a deontologic value system: the more explicit 
the decision a corporation makes to take an act that causes injury, the more that 
decision constitutes a directly intended harm. 
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other. To let the child perish in the well is equivalent to telling a 
known person that she is worth less than the resources it would take 
to save her; to fail to put covers on all wells delivers no such 
message to any particular person. The former action is an affront 
to an individual in the way the latter is not.104 We identify with 
the person who feels herself the victim of an intentional choice, 
even if the choice is an arguably good one (for instance, foregoing 
the rescue of one child in order to save the funds needed to avert 
peril to many more). 
The rescue examples deal with aiding. Blackmail is a case of 
harming. The role of direct intent in assessing the deontological 
status of harmful acts is usefully addressed with the "doctrine of 
double effect." 
Advocates of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) allow a 
departure from the strong constraints of deontologic theory. They 
argue that it can sometimes be morally permissible to do an act that 
has bad consequences if they are outweighed by the good, 105 so 
long as the harms are not directly intended.106 To determine 
104 Person-directed choices afford the choosers the ability to discriminate for or 
against individuals, while random effects provide no such opportunity. Perhaps part 
of the grievance involved in "direct" choices is that the known victim feels singled out 
in a way that the random victim may not. 
This consideration impacts on both equality and utility. Allowing person-directed 
discrimination creates the possibility of unequal treatment; this possibility may in turn 
lead to anger and revolt among those subjected to discrimination as well as personal 
demoralization. 
Kamm offers another possible explanation of why it might be particularly 
important not to cause direct intentional harm, noting that "[i]fwe are inviolable in 
a certain way, we are more important creatures than violable ones; such a higher 
status is itself a benefit to us." Kamm, supra note 16, at 386 (discussing the 
significance of inviolability). 
105 Sometimes the doctrine's effect is stated in an all-or-nothing manner. I find 
Quinn's approach more persuasive: 
The DDE .•. discriminates against agency in which there is some kind of 
intending of an objectionable outcome as conducive to the agent's end, and 
it discriminates in favor of agency that involves only foreseeing, but not that 
kind of intending, of an objectionable outcome. That is, it favors and 
disfavors these forms of agency in allowing that, ceteris paribus [other things 
being equal], the pursuit of a great enough good might justify one but not 
the other. 
Quinn, supra note 91, at 181. 
106 Nagel gives the principle the following interpretation: 
The principle [of double effect] says that to violate deontological constraints 
one must maltreat someone else intentionally. The maltreatment must be 
something that one does or chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather 
than something one's actions merely cause or fail to prevent but that one 
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whether a harm is directly intended, DDE asks, "if the harm could 
somehow be averted, would the actor undertake the disputed action 
anyway?" "[A] man is said not strictly, or directly, to intend the 
foreseen consequences of his voluntary actions where these are 
neither the end at which he is aiming nor the means to this 
end."107 
A standard hypothetical illustrating DDE compares strategic 
bombing (done to win the war by destroying munitions factories) 
with terror bombing (done to win the war by demoralizing the 
enemy). It is assumed that the war is a "just war," that both bomber 
pilots know how many civilians they will kill, and that both kinds of 
bombing will each kill exactly the same number of civilians. 
The killing of civilians does not motivate the strategic bomber's 
action and so is not his direct intent; we know this because if the 
civilians were somehow protected from injury, he would have 
bombed anyway. Under DDE, therefore, the strategic bomber in a 
just war does not necessarily violate deontological constraints. By 
contrast, the terror bomber would not bomb if civilians were 
protected, for then he could not accomplish his goal of demoraliz-
ing the enemy. Killing civilians is thus part of his "direct" intent. 
Therefore, even in a just war, terror bombing would be forbidden 
under DDE. 
Though the doctrine and its application have their difficul-
ties, 108 DDE serves as a useful tool for our purposes. The doc-
trine suggests that when one's direct intent is to do good, harmful 
side-effects do not constitute absolute constraints against the action. 
Conversely, in what one might call the "doctrine of single effect" 
(DSE), when one's direct intent is to do harm, beneficial side-effects 
doesn't aim at. 
NAGEL, supra note 88, at 179. 
1o7 Foot, supra note 98, at 61. 
108 It is difficult to distinguish between directly and obliquely intended effects; 
verbal acrobatics can turn virtually anything into an obliquely intended effect. See 
Kamm, supra note 16, at 376-78 . Were that to happen, a strict application of DDE 
might cause deontology to collapse into consequentialism. For this reason, among 
others, not all deontological theorists subscribe to DDE. See, e.g., Foot, supra note 98, 
at 65 (suggesting that application of DDE may lead to incorrect results). 
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have little or no deontological significance.109 DSE recapitulates, 
of course, the basic deontological position against using others. 
With regard to blackmail, our task is to decide what deontologi-
cal significance should be given to the fact that the blackmailer has 
a lawful liberty to do what he threatens to do. We are also 
interested in whether the deontological inquiry might (or must) take 
into account whatever beneficial effects could result from successful 
blackmaiI.110 Under DDE, one asks if the actor would change his 
behavior if the harmful effects were eliminated. Under my 
suggested correlative, DSE, one would ask if the actor would change 
his behavior if the beneficial effects were eliminated. Using that test, 
it appears that no significance should be given to either the lawful 
nature of the threatened disclosure or the potentially beneficial side-
effects of blackmail. Were the disclosure unlawful or impossible but 
the victim still capable of being frightened into paying, the typical 
blackmailer would extract the money anyway. Similarly, were the 
supposed beneficial side-effects of blackmail somehow eliminated, 
that would make no difference to the blackmailer. 
Under DSE, therefore, the blackmailer violates deontological 
constraints if he threatens disclosure in order to obtain money or 
other advantage because his intent is directed to the money, not to 
the disclosure or beneficial side-effects that might be produced. 
These latter factors are thus outside the intent of the blackmailer in 
the same way the killing of civilians is outside the intent of the 
strategic bomber: if blackmail's purported beneficial effects were 
eliminated or if civilians were protected, the actors would go 
forward. 
109 If an actor's end does not violate the deontologic constraints, then under the 
doctrine of double effect the existence of bad side-effects does not necessarily bar his 
activity. This may help to distinguish blackmail from a boycott or an act of civil 
disobedience. In such cases it may be that the end is good, perhaps because the 
persons being pressured may be receiving their "just deserts." CJ. Fletcher, supra note 
96, at 1635 (suggesting that it may be just to counteract the domination of one party 
by reducing him to the position of those he has dominated). If so, these activities 
may be distinguishable from blackmail because they may have a permissible or just 
end, while the blackmailer's end is to do an unjustified harm. But see Eric Mack, In 
Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273. 281-83 (1982) (arguing that blackmail is 
similar to boycotts and that neither should be criminalized). 
Haksar distinguishes civil disobedience from coercive threats according to the 
morality of the course of conduct the threatener will engage in if his threat is not 
carried out. See Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Ghandi], 4 POL. THEORY 
65, 67-68 (1976). My argument, by contrast, is that a threat with an immoral end can 
be condemned as coercive without reference to the nature of the threatened action. 
110 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
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Since the blackmailer's end is harm, the act is not redeemable 
by the possibility that some component of the means he uses might 
be lawful or beneficial.111 Like the terror bomber, the direct 
intent of the blackmailer is to do unjustified harm, and as with 
terror bombing, such intentional harm is impermissible regardless 
of the benefits that might also flow from it. 
D. The "Property Right" Objection 
One problem some observers have with blackmail law is the 
absence of any "property right" that the blackmailer has violat-
ed.112 Property rights are usually understood as a particular 
subset of rights characterized by their transferability and exclusivi-
ty .113 American law gives only very limited transferable and 
exclusive rights in reputation. These are the "rights of publicity," 
which are effective against use of one's name or likeness in 
trade.114 Admittedly, these transferable and exclusive rights in 
reputation do not apply to the kind of disclosure a blackmailer 
ordinarily contemplates. But nothing limits actionable "harm" to 
such a narrowly defined subset of rights. All that is needed is a 
HI One can argue that if an "end" is intentional harming, deontologic constraints 
will be violated even if a directly intended "means" is not itself harmful. For example, 
a person who perversely enjoys harming those he has benefitted may give candy to 
a child in the hope that the child will both enjoy the candy today and get cavities 
later. Whether or not the child is later affiicted with dental caries, it can be argued 
that the malevolent act still violates deontological constraints. One need not go so 
far in order to condemn a blackmailer's acts, however, for his means indeed do harm 
to his victim. 
n 2 Cf. Mack, supra note 109, at 276 (discussing the tension between rights-based 
and Eolicy-oriented justifications for criminalizing blackmail). 
I s See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 99-100 
& 100 n.11 (1977); A.M. HONORE, OWNERSHIP IN PROPERTY: CASES, CONCEPTS, 
CRITIQUES 78 (L.C. Becker & K. Kipnis eds., 1984); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710, 746-4 7 
(1917). 
n 4 In most states, the liberty to use one's name or depiction is "property" because 
exclusive rights to it can be conveyed to another. The turning point in the 
propertization of this liberty is the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The court held 
that a baseball player could make a binding assignment of a "right to publicity" 
encompassing the use of his photograph on baseball cards. Once such an assignment 
was made, it was binding even against other persons whom the player later wished to 
license and (presumably) against the baseball player himself. 
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justified holding or a justified liberty.115 If it is intentionally 
harmed, some justification must be shown.116 
This is hardly a novel suggestion. In 1887 Sir Frederick Pollock 
"asserted it to be 'a general proposition of English law that it is a 
wrong to do wilful harm to one's neighbor without lawful justifica-
tion or excuse.'"117 The common law is full of examples where 
judges protect nonproperty interests against malice.118 The tort 
of interference with prospective advantage, 119 and New York's 
prima fade tort, 120 provide particularly striking examples of 
judicial protection of nonproperty interests against activity where 
the only purpose is to cause harm. 121 Even where malice is 
115 See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 166-96 ( 1992) (discussing corrective justice 
as a substantive basis for property rights). American law has even premised property 
on 1uite inchoate rights, such as the liberty of using one's labor. See id. at 152-53. 
16 What I suggest here does not enshrine the status quo, both because of the 
wide range of justifications that exist (giving rise to privileges to harm) and because 
nonholders have many rights, too. The theory I discuss here is conservative only if 
joined to the notion that rights must be negative, "freedom-from" rights. See ISAIAH 
BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7-16 (discussing liberty as a "minimum area of 
personal freedom" within which there can be no interference}. But deontologic rights 
can also be positive; consider, for example, Locke's obligation of charity, which "gives 
every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream 
want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise." JOHN LOCKE, First Treatise, in 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT§ 42, at 170 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (2d ed. 1967) 
(1690). 
117 Philip Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement: A Petition for Rehearing, 
7 BUFF. L. REV. 7 n.6 (1957) (quoting POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 21 (lst ed. 1887)). 
Halpern's article is a general defense of the prima facie tort approach, which makes 
tortious any unjustified intentional causing of harm. 
118 One need not have a malicious feeling (spite, envy, etc.) in order to do a 
legally malicious act. Today "malice" (under that name or under the name "prima 
facie tort") is sometimes even used to refer to the causing of unjustified injury. Cf. 
Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Inteif erence with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 
345-46 (1980) (discussing the disappearance of an original malice requirement and 
the uncertainty involved in the application of prima facie tort law). 
On the possible role of intent-to-injure in malice, see supra text accompanying 
notes 105-06 discussing the doctrine of double effect). 
119 A leading case here is Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909} (finding a 
cause of action where barber alleged that another barber was set up in a competing 
shof: solely to harm plaintiffs business). 
20 The leading case here is Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 70 
N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1946) (finding a sufficient allegation of a prima facie tort where 
plaintiff music publisher claimed injury from defendant radio show sponsor's 
unscientific ranking of song popularity). For a more general discussion, see Halpern, 
supra note 117; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1894} (discussing policymaking components in the judicial 
recof.1ition of a privilege to inflict harm, especially in economic contexts). 
1 1 Perhaps the most vivid example, however, is provided by the classic case of 
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absent, non-property interests receive some legal protection. For 
example, no one considers mental well-being a "property" interest, 
yet probably all states recognize a tort of assault, which requires 
intentionally placing another in fear or apprehension of con-
tact, 122 and many states now recognize a tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.123 Some states even recognize a tort 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress.124 We have many 
conditional rights in aspects of our well-being which are functionally 
or by law nontransferable. Some of those conditional rights protect 
nonproperty interests even against the malicious use of property 
privileges that are otherwise well-established. 125 So it should not 
be surprising if blackmail law protected a nonproperty interest. 
In fact, to demand a property right as a premise for giving 
protection against harm is topsy-turvy. Many theorists have premised 
property on a deontological right against harm. For example, such 
a right is part of the foundation for John Locke's theory of proper-
ty.126 
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707). The plaintiff had been in the 
habit of capturing ducks who came to decoys he deployed on the water. The 
defendant began shooting his gun to scare the ducks away. Since the plaintiff had no 
possession of the escaping ducks, he had no title in them, and so the question arose 
whether the plaintiff had a sufficient interest in the prospective ducks to bring suit 
against someone who seemed to have no reason but malice for depriving him of that 
prospective advantage. Plaintiff's nonproperty interest was held sufficient to give him 
a ri~ht of action against uajustified harm. See id. at 1127-29. 
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 21 (1965). 
125 See, e.g., George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1971) 
(finding a cause of action where plaintiff suffered two heart attacks following 
harassment by a collection agency); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 
(1965). 
124 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914-25 (Cal. 1968) (en bane) (allowing 
recovery for emotional distress to a mother who saw her child struck and killed by an 
automobile). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 436A (1965) (finding no 
liability for negligent infliction of emotional disturbance absent physical harm). 
125 Consider, for example, the spite fence cases. There the court protects a 
neighbor's nonproperty interest in, e.g., an unobstructed view, against a neighbor's 
malicious attempt to block it off. Were the fence builder to have a reason to build 
other than causing injury, then the court would not give the neighbor's view any 
protection. See, e.g., Roper v. Durham, 353 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Ga. 1987) (finding that 
possible malicious intent was insufficient to justify removal of a fence when the fence 
was also installed to mark the property's boundary). 
126 See Second Treatise §§ 25-51, in LOCKE, supra note 116. For a discussion 
arguing that Lockean property concepts are dependent upon an underlying right 
against harm, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self&pression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533, 154049 
(1993). For discussion of a similar connection from the perspective of corrective 
justice, see Gordon, supra note 115, at 180-96, 207-10, 238-48. 
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Something like the "property rights" objection is sometimes 
attributed to Jeffrie Murphy, 127 but Professor Murphy has a more 
subtle difficulty with the liberal defense of blackmail law: he cannot 
see that the victim has had any rights violated. In particular, 
Murphy writes, a person who has done something discreditable has 
no right to a good reputation, so he has no ground for complaint 
if a blackmailer threatens to make discreditable but true disclo-
sures.128 Using the language of corrective justice, Murphy seems 
to think that a deontological case cannot be made against blackmail 
because the victim's reputation is not a justified holding. 
But the question of whether one has a "right to a good reputa-
tion" is irrelevant with regard to central case blackmail, for the 
deontological point is whether the victim has a right to be free from 
the harm that the other party intended and imposed. The harm 
intended and imposed in central case blackmail is not harm to 
reputation; it is harm to the victim's pocketbook or to her liberty. 
The central case blackmailer does not seek to place the victim's 
reputation at its "proper" level, 129 nor is that the usual effect of his 
actions.130 Rather, he seeks to extract something from the victim 
that is properly the victim's, usually money, or to make the victim 
do something (for example, sleep with him) that is ordinarily a 
behavior that the victim is at liberty not to engage in. The missing 
"rights" that Murphy seeks are therefore present and fairly noncon-
troversial: the rights not to have one's goods intentionally taken, or 
have one's liberty intentionally infringed, without justification. 
It is irrelevant whether or not it would be proper for the 
blackmailer to disclose the information, and thus destroy something 
127 See Mack, supra note 109, at 274-75 (criticizing the Murphy position). 
128 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162 ("It is unclear to me how you can have a 
right to the reputation of being a person of type X if in fact you have performed acts 
of type Y where Y acts are inconsistent with being an X person."}; see also Lindgren, 
supra note 10, at 699-700. 
129 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162. 
l!O Further, whether the victim deserves to have this person harm him is a different 
question from whether the victim deserves the harm in general. Considerations of 
corrective justice suggest that wrongful gains should be disgorged only to the 
individuals to whom redress is due, see Weinrib, supra note 41, at 429-50, or perhaps 
to the state. "Thus if A negligently injures X and B negligently injures Y, X cannot 
recover from B nor Yfrom A even if both injuries are identically quantifiable." Id. 
at 429. But see Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part 
II, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, 12-14 (1983} (suggesting that corrective justice does not require 
that an actor's unjust gains be disgorged to the particular person whom the actor 
harmed}. 
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the victim may value at a price even higher than the goods demand-
ed in the blackmail transaction. For no disclosure is intended and 
none occurs. Whatever justification might support disclosure, none 
supports a threat whose only motive and effect is to extract money 
or compliance.131 
E. Comparing Blackmail with the Ordinary Commercial Transaction 
Libertarians who recommend the legalization of blackmail 
sometimes claim that there is no way to distinguish blackmail from 
an ordinary commercial transaction.132 Yet the earlier discussion 
made clear there is an economic distinction: the central case 
blackmail transaction is nonallocative while the ordinary commercial 
exchange is allocative. 133 I here suggest two additional distinc-
tions, each keyed to the deontological inquiry: first, that the 
blackmailer intends to harm; and second, that regardless of intent, 
the buyer of silence in an extortion transaction suffers a net harm, 
while the buyer in an ordinary commercial transaction is benefit-
ted.134 
1. Intent to Harm 
The libertarian might argue that the ordinary buyer and seller 
have the same intent as the blackmailer does: that an ordinary 
buyer would be delighted to obtain goods without paying, and an 
ordinary seller would be delighted to obtain money without giving 
up goods. If so, the parties to the commercial transaction have the 
"real" or direct intent of extracting money or other advantage-just 
like the blackmailer. 
Most buyers and sellers, however, would in the long run prefer 
not to be exploitative. Perhaps on occasion people might enjoy 
181 Some liberties are permitted because they are good in themselves, and some 
for other reasons. When a liberty becomes disassociated from the reasons. that 
justified it, it can be prohibited. CJ. ARTHUR L. GOODHART, EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND TIIE COMMON LAW 179 (1931) (distinguishing between "liberties which the law 
recognizes and approves" and "liberties which the law recognizes but disapproves"). 
Thus disclosure is usually thought permissible because of the public interest in 
learning the relevant facts, and other related First Amendment concerns. These 
reasons are not available to justify nondisclosure. 
182 See 1 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A TREATISE ON • 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 443 n.49 (1962); Murphy, supra note 40, at 23-25. 
135 See supra text accompanying note 54. 
184 See infra parts IV.E.1-E.2. The discussion in part IV.E.2 also defends a 
particular conception of harm. 
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getting something for nothing, but most persons' sense of self 
respect is probably dependent on at least some degree of reciprocity 
in the bulk of their relations. ll15 If this is true (and I believe it is), 
then engaging in an ongoing activity that extracts something for 
nothing would be less desirable for most of us than engaging in 
commercial activity that involves exchanges. 
The converse-DDE approach would test this assertion by asking 
if it would make a difference to the parties' actions if reciprocity 
were eliminated. I believe that for most of us it would make a 
difference if one took away the element in exchange that gives 
benefits to others. For example, if all young people were given a 
choice of engaging in a career involving mutual exchange or in a 
career of exploitation, most would probably choose the former even 
if success were guaranteed in both. Take away the component of 
the buyer or seller's activity that benefits others, and she will find 
the activity less attractive; if so, then under the DSE test, part of the 
"real" or direct intent is to exchange and not to extract. 
Motive is a notoriously difficult basis on which to build 
fundamental legal distinctions.136 This point leads to the second 
distinction between blackmail and ordinary commercial transactions: 
the ordinary commercial party offers another party a benefit 
(regardless of motive), but the blackmailer imposes a harm. 
Nothing bars lawgivers from taking less note of motives than 
moralists might; it is perfectly acceptable for the law to permit Mr. 
Scrooge to engage in badly motivated acts that give others benefits, 
and simultaneously to prohibit badly motivated and directly harmful 
acts such as blackmail. 
2. Harm and Benefit 
Defining what should constitute a "harm" or "benefit" is 
particularly difficult when an entire transaction is at issue, for the 
parties will be differently situated at different times. For example, 
it would be futile to define as a benefit the return of something that 
the other party stole only a moment before. In order to capture the 
meaning of "harm" for an entire transaction, I suggest (building on 
155 See generally LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 73 (1986) ("Ethnographers, 
social anthropologists, historians and sociologists report in unison that people do 
'feel' ... [involuntary] obligations. In particular, they feel them toward benefac-
tors."). See also id. at 73-172 (arguing that reciprocity is a fundamental moral virtue 
which should guide the design of social structures). 
156 I am indebted to Dan Dobbs here. 
1772 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141: 1741 
the work of Nozick137 and Fried138) that a transaction is "harm-
ful" ifthe following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the thing the 
seller wants the buyer/victim to purchase is such that the buyer 
would be better off, in regard to that thing, if the seller and his 
resources139 did not exist, (2) the buyer/victim would be better 
off if the transaction were impossible140 and known by all parties 
to be impossible, and (3) the buyer/victim has done nothing to the 
other party that would give that party a corrective justice right 
against her.141 
157 This is an adaptation of the conditions Nozick states for an "unproductive" 
exchange. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38, 39. It is not fully clear whether 
Nozick means his conditions to state part ofa deontologic argument (as I interpret 
them) or whether he intended them as an economic argument as Lindgren suggests. 
See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 699-70. In any event, I have adapted them to the 
deontological framework. 
138 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 95-99 (1981). 
139 Among other changes, I have altered Nozick's first condition (that the victim/ 
purchaser would be better off in the absence of the seller) in several ways. Most 
importantly, in its new form, the first condition requires that the purchaser would be 
better off in the absence of the seller or his resources. Without this amendment one 
runs afoul of cases in which, for example, a landowner decides to cut off access to a 
distant portion of his estate solely to extract entrance fees from the frequent 
trespassers who use it as a shortcut. Cf. FRIED, supra note 138, at 95-99 (discussing 
such cases). With the amended first condition, it is clear that the trespassers are not 
"extorted" or harmed when they have to pay for access privileges, for they would not 
be better off in the absence of the landowner and his land. Without them, they 
would have no shortcut. 
Arguably a substitute for the added "resources" language is Nozick's implicit 
third condition that the seller/victim is harmed only if she does not deserve to have 
the other inflict on her the threatened harm. See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84 
(implying that the buyer/victim who purchases freedom from harm cannot be said 
to have gained nothing if she deserved to be harmed by the seller). 
140 The importance of the second condition can be illustrated by considering one 
ofLindgren's objections to Nozick. Lindgren interprets Nozick's position as resting 
solely on his first condition. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 699. (This may be a 
legitimate interpretation; Nozick's presentation is far from pellucid.) Lindgren then 
poses a standard claim-of-right case: "[A)ssume a tree on your land falls into a 
highway, striking a passerby. He threatens to sue you unless you pay him money." 
Id. Presumably, you would prefer to settle rather than to be sued. 
Lindgren correctly notes that Nozick's first condition cannot explain why this is 
not blackmail: since the person being sued may wish the other party had not existed, 
the first condition for an unproductive exchange is satisfied. See id. But the case 
does not satisfy Nozick's second condition. The landowner would be worse off if 
settling lawsuits were impossible. Therefore Lindgren's claim-of-right case is not 
central case blackmail, and the injured passerby is not harming the landowner ifhe 
extracts money in settlement or suit. 
141 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84; see also supra notes 38, 39, 139. 
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As was suggested in an earlier section of this Article, these three 
conditions all appear to be met in cases of central-case black-
mail.142 The third characteristic is present because the central-
case victim has not harmed the blackmailer. The second harm-
defining characteristic is present because if exchanges of silence for 
money were known to be impossible, the victim would be better off 
because the blackmailer would not bother with the transaction. The 
first characteristic appears to be satisfied because the victim/buyer 
would be better off if the blackmailer and the piece of information 
suddenly vanished. 
However, part of the first condition concerned the seller's 
resources, and I might be challenged to address whether the 
information the blackmailer wants to disclose is "his" resource. 
James Lindgren argues that blackmail is wrongful because the 
information belongs to third parties;143 others have argued that 
blackmail is wrongful because, under a privacy analysis, the 
information belongs to the victim;144 some libertarians think that 
blackmail is not wrongful because the information belongs to the 
blackmailer.145 
My response is simple: it does not matter whose resource the 
information is. If the information belongs to third parties or to the 
victim, the blackmailer is not selling something he owns, and the 
blackmail transaction can be condemned on that ground. But even 
if, as libertarians contend, the blackmailer "owns" the information, 
it is clear that the purchaser/victim is worse off in a world where 
the blackmailer and that resource exist. The blackmailer is 
therefore using that information in a way that harms the vic-
tim.146 In the ordinary commercial transaction, Seller (S) offers 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
145 See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 702-05. 
144 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 40, at 159 (framing, though later criticizing, the 
argument that a blackmailer violates a victim's rights "by making into a commodity 
and trying to sell back to the victim something which is really his already (his life)"). 
145 See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 132, at 157 (stating that "a man has no such 
objective property as 'reputation'"). 
146 Notice that my baseline for distinguishing harm from benefit is similar to that 
used in the standard tort case. "Harm" to a plaintiff in the usual tort context is 
determined by looking to the plaintifrs condition "in the absence of any interaction 
with the other party." Susan Rose-Ackerman, I'd Rather Be Liable Than You: A Note 
on Property Rules and Liability Rules, 6 INT'L REV. L. &: ECON. 255, 258 (1986). The 
controversial but still dominant "but for" test of causation exemplifies this approach. 
Of course, "interaction" requires definition. For example, a tort plaintiff does 
not lack actionable harm simply because the defendant had previously done the 
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Purchaser (P) some product or service that P wants that P could not 
have without paying S (or a supplier similar to S). If S (or a supplier 
similar to S) did not exist, P would have to do without the desired 
thing. P wants S to exist and make the off er. Conversely, P offers 
S money that S could not have without P (or a buyer similar to P). 
S wants P to exist and make the offer. S would be worse off if it 
were impossible for her to transact with P. 
In paradigmatic blackmail, by contrast, the individual selling 
silence (SS) is selling the plagued purchaser (PP) an unaffected 
reputation, something that PP would have had but for SS's actions. 
SS creates a threat, then offers to remove the threat. If SS {or a 
supplier similar to SS) did not exist, PP would have the desired 
thing. In the language of traditional explanations of blackmail 
law, 147 SS is parasitic upon his victim. In deontologic terms, there 
is nothing in SS's actions that bespeaks a concern for PP's welfare 
or for PP's goals. To the contrary: SS is treating PP merely as a 
means, in a way he would pref er not to be treated. 148 SS is violat-
ing the "impermissibility of self-preference" that lies at the center 
of Kantian morality.149 
The distinction between central case blackmail and the ordinary 
commercial transaction thus seems fairly secure, on both economic 
plaintiff a great service in some unrelated incident. It is necessary to define the 
component of the other party's existence that is relevant. I have defined the scope 
of the relevant interaction by reference to the very resource whose allocation is at 
issue. 
147 Hepworth's sociological eiramination of the British history of blackmail reveals 
parasitism or vampirism as a common image associated with blackmail. See MIKE 
HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PuBUCITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 25 (1975) 
(describing blackmail as a "social evil-a parasitical growth on the otherwise healthy 
bodl of society, sapping its strength and undermining its constitution"). 
48 A response might be that sometimes the blackmailer has a benign motive and 
his offer is indeed welcome to the victim. For example, take a journalist who comes 
across some information that would be painful to a given individual if disclosed. The 
information is, perhaps, of no substantive public import, yet "juicy" enough to give 
a small boost to the newspaper's circulation. Moved by concern for the individual, 
the reporter wishes not to publish; constrained by a fiduciary obligation to his 
newspaper, he is unwilling to benefit the individual at the expense of the newspaper. 
The reporter may offer to keep the item out of the newspaper provided the individual 
monetarily compensates the newspaper for the foregone circulation-boost. Such 
blackmail may be unlawful, but it is not condemned by the deontologic principle 
described above. Nozick argues such blackmail should be lawful, at least so long as 
the price for silence is no greater than what the journalist forgoes by his silence. See 
NOZICK, supra note 37, at 85-86. I take no position on this or other instances outside 
the domain of central case blackmail. 
149 Ernestj. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW&: PHILOS. 
37, 49-50 (1983). 
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and deontological grounds. Therefore, the primary libertarian 
argument against the wrongfulness of blackmail fails. 
V. CRIMINALIZATION 
The question still remains whether blackmail is the kind of act 
that should be criminalized. The deontological discussion above 
should have made clear that central case blackmail is a harmful act 
that, being unjustified and directly intended, is wrongful.150 As 
a wrongful harm, its criminalization is consistent with the liberal 
view that only the presence of harm toward others justifies criminal 
prohibition.151 It is also fairly clear that central case blackmail is 
economically w~teful because it invites expenditures that fail to 
make any significant change in the allocation of the contested 
inf ormation.152 Therefore, criminalizing central case blackmail 
is probably also consistent with Jeffrie Murphy's view that "immoral-
ity plus disutility is a reasonable basis for criminalization."153 
Although central case blackmail therefore appears eligible for 
potential criminalization, the question of whether blackmail should 
in fact be criminalized requires further analysis. For example, if 
one took an economic approach to criminalization, one would want 
to investigate factors such as the extent of the harm caused by 
blackmail (either by the blackmailer or by the victim's use of self-
help }, the extent to which criminalizing blackmail would decrease 
these harms, and whether the decrease in harm is likely to outweigh 
attendant enforcement costs. Though economics is not the whole 
of the matter, it will be useful to discuss some of these issues. 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 80-87. 
151 The liberal view that only the presence of harm toward others justifies criminal 
prohibition is associated historically with John Stuart Mill and more recently with Joel 
Feinberg. See MILL, supra note 64, at 91-92; see also JOEL FEINBERG, 4 THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238 (1990) (exploring 
whether outlawing blackmail "satisfies the requirements of the harm principle"). 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 48-53. 
155 Murphy, supra note 40, at 163 (emphasis omitted). Admittedly, the utilitarian 
and economic inquiries are not identical, but I suspect the utilitarian case against 
blackmail is even stronger than the economic one. 
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A. The Effects of Blackmail Law on Victim Behavior 
and Perceptions 
The effects that blackmail law might have on the behavior of 
potential defendants has been much discussed.154 It is important 
to note that criminalization also has an impact on blackmail victims, 
providing them with two tools to encourage and assist them in 
resisting the blackmailer's demands.155 The first tool the law 
provides is counter-leverage. The second is anger. 
1. Counter-leverage 
One imagines that were blackmail a tort, the victim would be 
unlikely to sue because of a fear that any trial of her suit would 
entail release of the embarrassing information which the victim 
wishes to keep secret. Unless in camera proceedings were easily 
available and enforceable, the information would come out; this 
disincentive to bringing suit would seem to provide one of the 
reasons why criminalization rather than a simple tort right is 
necessary if the law is to deter blackmail. Yet it is also commonly 
thought that when blackmail is criminal, victims are unlikely to 
report the crime out of a similar fear that prosecution would entail 
release of the embarrassing information.156 Nevertheless, anec-
dotal evidence seems to be available suggesting that persons 
threatened with blackmail may have some hope of maintaining 
confidentiality even if they report the crime.157 
154 Prohibiting blackmail may deter directly or may encourage character-formation 
that discourages bad acts. By contrast, legalization might not only increase the threat-
related use of information already possessed, but might also increase the expenditures 
made on acquiring new information. Thus, criminalizing blackmail has an obvious 
goal of discouraging potential blackmailers from undertaking blackmail and blackmail 
attempts. Therefore, although blackmail law may fail to serve an individual who has 
the unfortunate luck to be the chosen prey of one of the few undeterred bad actors, 
the number of bad acts-and thus the number of victims-may be reduced by such law. 
155 These tools are available whenever blackmail is unlawful, including instances 
beyond the central case of blackmail; whether the tools should be available is part of 
the question which needs to be answered whenever a type of blackmail is made 
unlawful. 
156 See HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 22 (by implication). The specific constitu-
tional right to "public" trials in criminal matters, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI, would 
make secrecy of the proceedings even more unlikely than in the civil context. 
157 See HEPWORTH, supra note 14 7, at 22-24 (noting that authorities in England are 
often willing to preserve confidentiality). One can question the empirical assumption 
that victims would in fact be as fearful of initiating a criminal prosecution as of 
bringing a civil suit. For example, the prevalence of plea bargaining in the criminal 
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But determining how large a percentage of blackmail attempts 
are reported to the police is largely beside the point. The ability to 
threaten to go to the police may be more important than actually 
going to them. By threatening to go to the authorities if and only if 
disclosure is made, victims can discourage blackmailers from disclos-
ing the contested information.158 This is what Joel Feinberg 
terms "counterblackmail. "159 The presence of counterblackmail 
makes criminalization important even if victims prior to disclosure 
are unwilling to seek the authorities' aid. 
The law that criminalizes blackmail itself supplies to all victims 
a chip needed to engage in such counterblackmail: the law 
transforms the fact that the blackmail attempt has been made into 
information that could, if disclosed, subject the blackmailer to 
criminal prosecution. Essentially, the victim may tell the blackmail-
er that he will be reported unless he withdraws his unlawful threat. 
Unlike the blackmailer, who uses the threat of disclosure to 
force the victim to give up something (for example, money) to 
which the blackmailer has no right, the victim engaging in counter-
blackmail is using her threat to enforce her rights-to force the 
blackmailer to cease his wrongful behavior towards her. Since this 
is the victim's "own chip, "160 and the use of the chip as leverage 
is neither "unproductive" nor an "unjustified harming,"161 the 
victim should be permitted to make this counter-threat. Further, 
whether or not a state allows counterblackmail, it is hard to believe 
that a prosecutor would use her discretion to prosecute a victim 
who used counterblackmail to block continuing threats. 
Given the criminalization of blackmail, then, the blackmailer and 
the assertive victim appear to be at a standoff: the blackmailer 
area might obviate the need for a public trial, and police could then keep the delicate 
information confidential. 
158 This point is also made by Posner and Shaven, though they differ with regard 
to its significance. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmai~ Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1837 (1993) (arguing that "[A] blackmailer cannot easily 
conceal his identity from the blackmail victim .... Once the victim knows who the 
blackmailer is, he has as potent a secret as the blackmailer"); Steven Shaven, An 
Economic Analysis of Threats and their Illegality: Blackmai~ Extortion, and Robbery, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1890 (1993) (noting that "it is frequently difficult to obtain 
evidence that a blackmailer made a threat"). 
159 FEINBERG, supra note 151, at 268. 
160 Lindgren, supra note 10, at 707. 
161 It is also not central case blackmail. Among other things, the victim did not 
acquire the information for the purpose of extracting an advantage from the 
threatener. 
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threatens to disclose unless money is paid, and the victim threatens 
to disclose unless the blackmailer abandons his threat. The victim's 
threat to disclose the blackmailer's threat may prevail as most 
credible, 162 for the blackmailer knows that if he discloses the 
victim will have nothing to lose. What would in fact occur case-by-
case probably depends, inter alia, on the participants' strength of 
will, and on the level of the various positive and negative pay-
offs.168 But it seems clear that the criminalization of blackmail 
can serve as a tool to foil blackmail attempts in at least some 
instances. 
Counter-leverage has another virtue as well. The possibility that 
offended persons will resort to violent self-help has always been part 
of the rationale for instituting legal rights, 164 and it has been 
suggested that blackmail should be made criminal lest victims have 
no choice but to employ violence and other undesirable self-help 
efforts against those who threaten them. The availability of 
counterblackmail not only tends to remove the occasion for self-help 
by potentially discouraging some blackmail attempts before they 
begin, but also gives the victim an alternative self-help weapon to 
protect herself, one that is much less destructive and disruptive to 
society as a whole than violence. 
2. Anger 
As Judge Posner has suggested, only sophisticated victims may 
be able to take advantage of the leverage that counterblackmail can 
provide.165 But criminalization of blackmail has another function 
that is useful even for the unsophisticated victim. It reinforces her 
sense that she has a "right" to be free of such threats, and thus 
162 Tape recording a blackmail threat may provide the victim strong evidence. 
However, whether a victim can lawfully tape a blackmailer's telephoned threats may 
depend, inter alia, on whether counterblackmail is lawful. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510(4), 2511(2)(d) (1988) (a party to a communication may make "aural 
acquisition" of it except "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act"). 
165 Examples of possible payoff variables include, among others, the degree of the 
victim's fear of disclosure, the amount of money demanded by the blackmailer, and 
the degree of the blackmailer's fear of disclosure (which will in turn be affected by 
how much evidence the victim has). For a useful discussion of strategic variables in 
the blackmail context, see Russell Hardin, Blackmailing/or Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1787 (1993); Shavell, supra note 158. 
164 See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 796 (Or. 1959), cert. 
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (arguing that the trespass tort was historically seen "partly 
at least as a means of discouraging disruptive influences in the community"). 
165 See Posner, supra note 158, at 1836-37. 
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reinforces her willingness to angrily refuse the blackmailer's 
demands. Since a central case blackmailer has no incentive of his 
own to disclose, little may be required to dissuade him from 
disclosing; even unreasoned resistance may suffice.166 
Many commentators have noted that the legal prohibition of 
blackmail does not serve the interest of the victim who, in instances 
where the prohibition fails to deter, would prefer payment to disclo-
sure.167 That is true. The image on which the blackmail prohibi-
tion rests is a quite different type of victim, one who is put into 
mental pain and fear by blackmail threats, 168 but who will never-
theless have no truck with dishonor. The image suggests a person 
should not be so ashamed of her past or so unwilling to face the 
truth that she would give in to ignoble manipulation.169 
"Honor" can be given a utilitarian construction: it is behavior 
that helps the collective even if it hurts the immediate actor.170 
166 If his threat fails, and if he is not in the business of making future threats 
credible, he has no reason to disclose; in fact, blackmail's unlawfulness gives him a 
good reason to lay low. Cf. supra part V.A.l (discussing counter-leverage). A 
thoughtful blackmailer may recognize that the probability that a victim will go to the 
police may increase dramatically after disclosure is made, even in cases where the 
victim was not originally aware of the option. 
167 See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 10, at 680-97 (discussing several commentators' 
theories of when a victim pays for information). ' 
168 See HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 19 (noting a judge's view of blackmail as 
"'slow death"' (quoting THE TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 2, 1924 (Justice Mccardle))); id. 
at 21 (characterizing blackmail as "'moral murder"'); id. at 22 (stating that the 
blackmailer's "ennervating [sic] and relentless pressure allegedly produced a state of 
suicidal despair"). 
169 This may seem to contradict the stereotypical victim's almost mortal weakness 
described by Hepworth's researches. See supra note 168. But Hepworth recognizes 
that "by going to the police it was possible to stave off the appalling effects of moral 
murder." Id. at 23. 
Hepworth quotes an aphorism stating that "Blackmail is possible only when 
individuals are discreditable." Id. at 7 (quoting LAUD HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE 
CLOSETS (1972)). This apparently assumes that the discreditable behavior necessary 
for a successful blackmail is the behavior that occurred some time in the past-the 
behavior the blackmailer has uncovered and now threatens to reveal. My argument 
is that blackmail is possible only when individuals exhibit discreditable behavior at the 
time of the blackmail threat because the honorable course of action at that time is to 
resist. 
This notion of resistance appears occasionally in Hepworth's historical accounts 
of blackmail incidents. A news report of a nineteenth century blackmail trial stated: 
"It was not everyone who had the courage to come into court and show the absolute 
falsehood of the accusation made [by the blackmailer]; but Earl Carrington had done 
that, and he had performed a great service to the public in so doing." HEPWORTH, 
supra note 147, at 26 (quoting THE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1897). (It is not entirely clear 
whether the quoted language is that of the Times reporter or of the trial judge.) 
170 I am indebted to Warren Schwartz for this argument. See Warren Schwartz et 
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If one assumes that acts of blackmail impose net costs on soci-
ety, 171 then the socially beneficial response to a blackmailer is to 
resist in order to convince potential blackmailers that blackmail 
never succeeds, and thus to silence their threats.172 Upholding 
the image of an honorable and resistant victim may be worth the 
cost to those occasional victims who are not convinced by the image 
and want to give in. 
The law may not only provide the honorable resister with 
counterblackmail as a means to resist blackmailers, but may also 
give her the psychological energy to resist. Sometimes we legislate 
against something in order to keep our sense of outrage alive.173 
Blackmail law may fall into this category. If the law permitted 
blackmail transactions, blackmail's perceived moral status might be 
transformed: gradually it might come to seem acceptable to us as 
observers, blackmailers, or victims, that a victim should pay. If so, 
persons who are blackmailed might become less effective in fighting 
back. The law may have an effect not only on potential criminals, 
al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 331 
(1984). 
Recall that most economists assume that allowing blackmail will result in "digging 
up dirt only to rebury it again." See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. This 
in turn assumes that the only factor that will matter to victims is a comparison of the 
price the blackmailer is demanding with the reputational cost of disclosure. That is, 
the primary economic analysis of blackmail assumes that victims will act with a 
particular and narrow set of self-interested economic motives. A victim with 
utilitarian or deontologic motives, by contrast, might act in a way that furthers the 
interest of society without furthering his own economically defined self-interest. 
171 One might argue, however, that blackmail is beneficial in the information it 
reveals, but this would not apply to the central case which usually results in the 
purchase of silence. One might also argue blackmail is a useful tool for "keeping 
people honest" and increasing the social costs of bad action; this point might be 
relevant in assessing the costs and benefits of outlawing central case blackmail. See 
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
172 From a deontologic perspective, resistance to evil is a fundamental virtue. See 
BECKER, supra note 135, at 74-76, 97-101, 146-50. The victim who accedes to tyranny 
today exposes other victims to vulnerability tomorrow. Furthermore, buying silence 
is an evil in a way that being silent may not be. Passively hiding awkward facts-for 
example, choosing to live a creditable life in a new town after serving a criminal 
sentence-does not "use" others in the way that a deliberate decision to conceal may 
do. Finally, in buying silence, one also shows insufficient respect for one's self. To 
pay to hide something about one's self may be a shaming act inconsistent with human 
flourishing. Cf. Radin, supra note 23, at 1906 (arguing that understanding integral 
aspects of our personal lives as "monetizable or completely detachable from the 
person .•. is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human"). 
175 CJ. CALABRESI, supra note 102, at 16 (exploring "what it does to the state and 
to all of us" to have the state making explicit tradeoffs between life and other values). 
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but also on potential victims and on their sense of what their own 
best behavior should be. 
If blackmail is criminalized, by contrast, it helps maintain a 
sense of outrage as a weapon against blackmail. As in any bilateral 
monopoly situation, it is the person who "won't budge," and can 
credibly convince the other that she won't in fact budge, who wins. 
Several commentators have suggested the blackmail bargain is often 
irrational-a last gasp effort to stave off nearly inevitable catastro-
phe, in which the victim will almost always be the long-term 
loser.174 If so, anger may be the best antidote to panic. Anger is 
a passionate emotion, yet, ironically, in this context it may be the 
best preserver of rationality. 
The following discussion, though tentative, will suggest some 
reasons why this may be the case. The blackmailer brings up 
something embarrassing or private. It is a shaming experience to 
have such facts brought up by a hostile party. (Raised by a friend, 
the same issues' exposure can lead to increased intimacy rather than 
shame.) Shame can inhibit both justified anger and the self-
confidence necessary for self-protection.175 Yet, as the Sabini and 
Silver analysis176 of the Milgram experiments177 showed, some-
times one needs confidence in one's self-willfulness, unwillingness 
to go along-in order to do right under pressure. The potential 
174 See David Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned1, 63 PHIL. 501, 511-13 (1988) 
(arguing that a victim of blackmail is forced to choose between two losing options); 
see also Murphy, supra note 40, at 166 ("Blackmail and the privacy invasions it invites 
tend to lead to harassment that is unending in nature."). 
175 Shame tends to encourage conformity. The hostile stranger's revelation can 
thus increase both the intensity of the victim's psychological need to please the 
community and with it her desperation to avoid further disclosures that would make 
the community cast her out. Further, if the information regards moral or other 
weakness, then the blackmailed person may feel less entitled to fight on her own 
behalf. 
176 JOHN SABINI&: MAURY SILVER, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 55-87 (1982). 
177 Extrapolating from the cruelty inflicted by World War H's concentration 
camps, Stanley Milgram tested the extent to which the ordinary person would be 
willing to "follow orders" even if following orders meant inflicting pain. Experimental 
subjects were told to administer electric shocks of increasing intensity on other people 
(supposedly fellow experimental subjects, but in actuality colleagues of the 
experimenter), supposedly as part of a psychology experiment investigating the 
impact that pain has on learning. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 
13-26 (1974). On the experimenter's orders, a surprisingly high number of persons-
up to 65% of the experimental subjects, see id. at 35 (table 2)-pushed the levers that 
supposedly inflicted pain (marked "Danger: Severe Shock" and "XXX"), even after 
the "subject" had begun to scream, pied to be let go, or feigned unconsciousness. See 
id. at 22. 
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victim needs her sense of outrage to fight off the wound to self-
esteem inflicted by the blackmailer, a wound that itself might impair 
her overall capacity for moral action. 
Sabini and Silver suggest, quite rightly, that an actor's ability to 
act morally is often undermined by her inability to trust her-
self.178 The tale of one's own unpleasant past deeds might surely 
undermine self-trust. It also may undermine one's sense of one's 
own self-interest. The knowledge that the blackmailer is acting 
unlawfully may bolster the victim's sense of outraged pride and self-
worth when she most needs such psychological assistance. 
Legal commentary that questions the utility of blackmail law may 
underestimate the value of pride. Our society as a whole may 
underestimate its value as well. Compare for example the Christian 
ethos with Aristotle's. Christian doctrine says turn the other 
cheek;179 Aristotle said that one who takes a blow without return-
ing it is a slave.180 The prideful victim is one who will resist 
others' bad acts.181 
178 Sabini and Silver suggest essentially that immoral acts can result when we 
identify morality with an externally-imposed constraint on our desires, and identify 
sin with what we desire to do. See SABINI & SILVER, supra note 176, at 67-69. When 
this happens, our "crossed wires" may leave us virtually helpless when confronted by 
a situation where the moral impulse is internal ("I don't want to hurt these people") 
and the immorality is coming from the external authority (the experimenter giving 
orders to the experimental subjects, or the concentration-camp commandant giving 
orders to new guards). See id. In such situations, every moral impulse comes in the 
guise of temptation, and every immoral order comes in the guise of duty, so it can 
be hard to tell them apart. See id. In these situations, following one's internal 
impulses would lead to more moral action than obeying the unpleasant order, but 
that requires a degree of self-trust. 
179 See Matthew 5:39-40 (The New English Bible, 2d ed. 1970) ("But what I tell you 
is this: Do not set yourself against the man who wrongs you. If someone slaps you 
on the right cheek, turn and offer him your left.") 
180 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS § 15, at 124 (Martin Oswald trans., 1962) 
("People seek either to requite evil with evil-for otherwise their relation is regarded 
as that of slaves-or good with good, for otherwise there is no mutual contribution.") 
Actually, it may be that the Christian ethos also does not invariably demand forgiving 
nonresistance. See Luke 17:3 (The New English Bible, 2d ed. 1970) ("If your brother 
wrongs, reprove him; and if he repents, forgive him.") (emphasis added). It takes both 
pride and courage to reprove the powerful. 
181 See BECKER, supra note 135, at 74-76, 97-101, 146-50 (arguing that resistance 
to evil is a virtue). 
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B. Implications for Enforcement Costs 
The two tools provided by blackmail laws-counter-leverage and 
anger-involve a fairly inexpensive form of self-help. When 
successfully employed, they can foil blackmail attempts without 
violence, intensive private investment, or the use of police or courts. 
To the extent that criminalization makes possible the effective use 
of counter-leverage and anger, enforcement costs will be reduced. 
The lower the costs of enforcement, the more desirable (other 
things being equal) the criminalization of blackmail. 
CONCLUSION: A COMMENT ON INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
Would victims' resistance-sparked perhaps by anger, a sense of 
honor, 182 a moral preference, 183 or pride-undermine the 
"waste" argument of Coase, Ginsburg and Shechtman, Daly and 
Giertz, and Epstein?184 The waste argument was premised on the 
assumption that blackmail would not cause any allocative effects 
because the victim would always buy silence, while the instant 
discussion suggests that honorable and angry persons would not buy 
silence. An economist wants the most accurate measure of the 
demand function available; the motivation of the demand is less 
important than the result. 
Blackmail attempts are likely to have few allocative effects on the 
distribution of information even in the presence of a sense of 
honor, so long as blackmail is unlawful. This is because the counter-
leverage provided by the legal prohibition makes it risky for the 
blackmailer to reveal it. 
If blackmail is lawful, however, counter-blackmail disappears as 
an option. If in a significant number of victims the sense of honor 
182 It may still be possible for an economic analysis to fully take into account the 
notion of honor. For interesting explorations of the interplay that can exist between 
instrumentalist and deontologic beliefs, see CALABRESI, supra note 102; GUIDO 
CAI.ABRESI &: PHILLIP BOBBITI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); Schwartz et al., supra note 
170. 
185 By the victim's "moral" preference, then, I mean to indicate a demand 
structure in which resistance-plus-disclosure has a positive value for the victim, even 
in circumstances where the blackmailer is willing to accept an amount of money less 
than the amount of damage the disclosure will do to the victim's reputation. 
Conceivably, even an economically self-interested agent might possess such a 
preference pattern. But at least at this juncture, what we think of as nondeontic 
moral beliefs seem a more likely basis for explaining why persons in such circum-
stances might prefer disclosure to buying silence. 
184 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the waste argument). 
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and anger survives the erosion that legalization might initiate, then 
that partially undoes the assumption on which the arguments of 
Daly & Giertz et alia are premised.185 The victim's willingness to 
pay would no longer be a function solely of the damage disclosure 
could do; she might be unwilling to pay despite significant destruc-
tive potential. In such an event, blackmail attempts could spark 
allocative changes in the distribution of information. 
To the extent that criminalizing blackmail would deprive third 
parties of information that would be disclosed if blackmail were 
lawful, the costs and benefits of such fore gone disclosure would 
have to be assessed and incorporated into the economists' analysis 
of blackmail law. The economic analysis would become more 
complex. 
From a deontological perspective, however, it would not matter 
whether or not blackmail attempts would sometimes result in 
beneficial disclosures of information. The doctrine of double effect 
indicates that a person making extorsive threats cannot escape 
moral condemnation by pointing to unintended beneficial side-
effects of her behavior. Thus, to the extent that the desire to resist 
blackmail is a fact of human psychology, the accounts of central case 
blackmail provided by economic and deontologic theorists might 
diverge. 
Perhaps we finally have, if not a paradox, an irony. When 
victims act as deontological moral agents, they resist, and a 
government applying a deontological approach would aid their 
resistance by deciding that blackmail is wrongful and should be 
discouraged. When victims act as narrowly-defined economic agents 
(motivated by the Daly-Giertz demand structure), a government 
applying economic logic would recognize that blackmail is wasteful 
and similarly decide that it should be discouraged. Thus, a nation 
that is ruled by the same single-gauge principles as its people would 
outlaw blackmail. But when the motives of a significant portion of 
the victim population are moral rather than economic, and the 
government applies an economic logic in ordering legal relations, 
it is then that the deontological and consequential logics may lead 
to diverging recommendations. It may be that the two accounts are 
185 See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the assumption by Daly and 
Giertz that the victim's willingness to pay for silence is solely a function of the 
reputational damage the blackmailer is capable of inflicting). 
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most likely to converge, ironically, when the economic account fails 
to take account of the other's effects. 
Postscript 
Ironies aside, I want to acknowledge that the sharp distinctions 
made in this paper between consequentialism and deontology are 
merely a mode of facilitating discourse. The final judgment on 
blackmail law (or any law) should depend neither on consequential-
ism nor on deontologic morality, but on some as yet unstated 
combination of the two. A primary task for normative theory is to 
provide a satisfactory integration of the objective and subjective 
viewpoints186 that, together, appeal to us as constitutive of morali-
ty. 
186 See NAGEL, supra note 88, at 185-88. 

